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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
IN ATOMIC ENERGY
Rear Admiral w; K Parsons, U. S. 'f;v.
Admiral Smith and Gentlemen of the War College:I think that the best way to start a discussion on problems
and prospects in atomic energy is to cover a few basic definitions of
Nuclear Physics. First, nuclear fission, which is induced in the

nuclei of several atoms at the heavy end of the atomic series. The
nuclear fission which concerns us is fission of the Uranium 235
and Plutonium. nuclei. In both of these nuclei the disturbance be

gins when a neutron enters the nucleus. .Since a neutron, by defini
tion, has no electrical charge, it is neither attracted nor repelled by

the nucleus, so that most impacts are penetrative. Immediately,
after the neutron has penetrated a Uranium 235 or Plutonium

nucleus, a major disturbance takes place in this very dense sphere
of "jelly". The balance between electrical repulsion and sub-atomic
cohesive forces is so upset that the sphere turns into a dumbbell

shape, then the terrific electrical repulsion of the two . smaller
"bells" accelerates them to very high velocities. As they break

apart, each of them snaps. ba�k into spherical shape, . This violent

oscillation of the. new nuclei results in ejection of"one or more

neutrons by eac!i new nucleus. In about one percent of the cases, this
ejection of a neutron is delayed for a time ranging up to a few
seconds.

a

or .

The essential· properties of
mi.cleat fuel
explosive are
two : first, that it must be fissionable by slow or fast neutrons in
the sense that I have just described; second, that the result of its
fission must not 'only be the release of energy, but also the release
Admiral Parsons is Director of Atomic Defense in the Office of CNO.
Since' 1943 he has been closely associated with the atomic bomb
project and .served as weaponeer in the Hirochima bombing, This
lecture was delivered at the Naval War College on 14 September 1948.
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of a sufficient number of neutrons to cause further fission. It is a
scientific fact that the nuclei of only three atoms fulfill the two

requirements which make them nuclear fuels.

These three atoms

are the 239 Isotope of Plutonium and two isotopes of Uranium,

namely, Uranium 233 and Uranium 235. Two of these three known

nuclear fuels do not occur in nature, and, therefore, must be pro

duced artificially by transmutation.

Plutonium is produced by

bombardment of Uranium 238 with neutrons, resulting in Pluton

ium 239.

Uranium 233 is produced by neutron bombardment of

Thorium 232 which results in Uranium 233. It is an odd and some-

. what ironic fact that to produce the two man-made nuclear fuels in
usable amounts, it is necessary to "burn" Uranium 235, the only

natural fuel, in order to get the astronomical number of neutro,ns
required in the process.

Up to now, I have casually referred to isotopes.

I know

from experience that many people are unfamiliar with the meaning

of this Greek word.

The term isotope is used to differentiate be

tween atoms of the same element which have different weights. The

chemical properties of an atom do not depend on the weight of the
nucleus, but only on the number of electrical charges in the nucleus.

By our present concept, this means the number of protons in the

nucleus.

Thus, there are three known isotopes of Hydrogen.

Or

dinary Hydrogen has a nucleus consisting of a single proton. Heavy
Hydrogen, or Deuterium, has a proton and a neutron in the nuclous,

whereas Tritium, or triple-weight Hydrogen, has ·a proton and two
neutrons in its nucleus.

Having disposed of nuclear chemistry, we now come to the

term "critical mass" of fissionable material. An exact definition of

critical mass would require several pages of fine print, but an over

simplified one is all that we need here. There is no analogy to a
critical mass in the case of chemical fuels or explosives.

If there
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were, it would be impossible to make a sub-critical amount of TNT
or coal ignite, but a super-critical amount would ignite spontaneous
ly. For our purposes, a critical mass of fissionable material can be
defined as the amount reached when the number of neutrons which
escape from the surface is exactly balanced by the number of new

neutrons created by fission within the mass. Obviously, an im
portant factor in the critical size or mass ·is the number of neu
trons released per fission. If this number were less than one and
one-half for example, .the critical mass would be tremendous and
the volume might exceed the size of this room. In that case, further
discussion of atomic energy would be quite academic.
Now, having defined a critical mass, the question of producing
an explosion arises. My favorite way to discuss an atomic bomb in
unclassified language is to picture two hams in a butcher shop. Each
of the hams is sub-critical by itself. The flies in the butcher shop are

the neutrons, and, as long as the hams are more than a diameter
apart, a fly landing on either of them does not produce a chain re

action which builds up. However, if the hams are brought together

in some fasliion so that no fly lands on either of them until they have
merged, there will be a real surprise when the next fly lands. In

this case, we have surprised Nature by presenting her with a highly
super-critical assembly. Nature then gets back at us by presenting
us with a runaway chain reaction called an atomic explosion. In the

case of an atomic bomb, there are two important time intervals.
First, the assembly interval which involves mechanical movement,
and, therefore, is relatively slow. The second interval is measured

in fractions of a millionth of a second. It starts with the beginning
of the runaway chain reaction and ends when the fissionable ma
terial has expanded to a point at which it is again below critical.
I would turn now to the effects of this atomic explosion. The·
first effect considered is blast. We are all familiar with the destruc-
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tive effect of blast from bombs with chemical high explosives. In
these pre-atomic bombs, the blast is intense in the immediate vicinity

of the bomb but is of very short duration. It delivers a hammer blow
or very sharp impulse to any unyielding material in the vicinity. In
the case of an atomic bomb, material in the immediate vicinity, of
course, would be incandescent.

At distances of the order of one

half mile, the push of the shock wave and mass movement of the air

lasts ten to one hundred times longer than the sharp push of an ordi
nary block-buster. Therefore, it is effective in knocking down
buildings and other structures which are built to withstand only the
side pressure of a hurricane or the shaking of a mild earthquake.

It is important to remember that a building has a tremendous
amount of potential energy which is released when it falls on. itself.
Then, if a falling building sets itself on fire, it proceeds to release

a great deal of chemical energy. The point is, that an atomic bomb
does not, by its own power, obliterate a city. It merely starts things
and the city then obliterates itself.
In the case of Hiroshima, the only effect of the atomic blast
was to raise a curtain of dust about, 200 feet thick over the smashed

city. Only one fire was visible one minute after the bomb detonated,

and that was on a hillside. Perhaps some blacksmith shop had been
knocked down.

As Los Alamos was being organized, we did a lot of. talking
about the explosion of an ammunition ship in Halifax Harbor in De
cember 1917. That ship carried the equivalent of 2800 tons of TNT,
and the explosion was reported to have had terrible effects on the
city. We studied these reports carefully, butit w.as not until after
the explosion of an ammunition ship at Port Chicago, in July 1944,
that we became realistic in our estimate of blast damage. In the
case of Port Chicago, which was an ammunition depot north of San
Francisco, 1600 tons of high explosives detonated. I arrived at the
scene less than .two days later and made a personal check of the dam'
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age, The Naval magazine at Port Chicago had built-in protection
against large explosions. With some luck, this protection was ef
fective in preventing any secondary explosions or fires. In - the
light of the Port Chicago results, we reanalyzed the Halifax re
ports and concluded that a major factor in the Halifax disaster was
a record blizzard which struck the city a. few hours after the ex
plosion.

The results of Halifax and Port Chicago have been confirmed
on a larger scale by Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Bikinf "ABLE".
From these we can conclude that no spectacular blast damage will be
done to tough structures like bridges, steel ships and heavy rein
forced concrete buildings. Naturally, there would be a short range,

say a few hundred yards, inside which practically any structure

above ground would be rendered useless.

·1 have already covered damage f!om secondary.fires. There
is a·further hazard from primary fires caused by the radiant heat of
th� bomb. I do not believe that this primary heat hazard is very
serious except to exposed people. While wood and other inflam

mable material will char and smolder, .any flash ·fires are apt to be
blown out by the violent blast which arrives withina second or so.
A most import�nt factor in the lethality of an air burst
atomic bomb comes from the radioactivity. In this case, the over
whelming effect is from gamma radiation artd all of this radiation
dosage is received in the fir'st few seconds after the bomb detonates.
After this, the ball' of fire,.•has· risen so far toward the strato
sphere that it no longer irradiates the dty. An air burst placed
for maximum blast damage will not deposit arty radioactive ma�
terial on a city. People within a mile of an air ·burst bomb, who
have been shielded in some fashion from the radiant heat but not
shielded from the penetrating gamma radiation will show no effects
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for several hours.

Then, if they have received heavy dosage they
will become nauseated, and, in case of extreme exposure, will die

within a few days.
within a week.

1

Marginal cases will show ordinary infections

These arise from the fact that the radiation kills

the unborn white corpuscles in the blood, and, therefore, the �ody
is unable to fight off normal infections. Red blood corpuscles are

also affected, but their cycle of repla�ement is longer, so this effect
shows up after several weeks. Combatting infection by use of
Penicillin and replacing blood by transfusion in marginal cases help
recovery.
The semi-permanent radioactive contamination caused by

· the underwater atomic burst in the Bikini "BAKER" test has been
given great prominence as the first sample of radioactive war
fare.

It is certainly true that the mist called the "base surge",

which was formed by the falling column of water, initially con

tained the equivalent of one thousand tons of radium and deposited

an appreciable amount of this poison in the water and on the tar
get ships.

Such a. drenching would almost certainly have killed

most of the crews of the ships which were completely enveloped.

But, a most important point to remember is that the intensity

of the gamma radiation from the fission fragments of an atomic

burst decreases rapidly with time.

Thus,' at the end of sixty min

utes, the radiation intensity is perhaps one percent of what it was
at one minute.

And, at the end of twenty-four hours, it has de

creased to say one-thirtieth of what it was at one hour.

It requires

very delicate instruments to record the radiation intensity in the

remaining Bikini target ships two years after the "BAKER" test.

If the Bikini "BAKER" test is a sample of. radioactive warfare, it
can be said that our experience .in handling the aftermath of an

atomic attack indicates that the principal difficulties are logistic
and administrative.

By this I mean supply and replacement of

clothing and keeping complete records of the· exposure accumulated
by all men who work in contaminated spaces.
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Since there has been confusion on this point, I would like to
emphasize that Uranium and Plutonium do not give off gamma
radiation, and, therefore, do not require heavy shielding to protect
people in the immediate vicinity. For example, you could sit on an
unshielded atomic bomb indefinitely without damage to yourself
or your descendants. It follows from this fact, that no radiation
detection instrument so far conceived would have any chanc_e of de
tecting even an unshielded atomic bomb at a distance exceeding a
foot ortwo.
Up to now, I have discussed the uncontrolled chain reactions
of atomic bombs. A controlled chain reaction in a pile or nuclear
reactor involves us in many difficult problems which are skipped
in the case of the bomb. The controlled chain reaction was used in
the Hanford Uranium-Carbon piles to produce Plutonium. In this
case, the neutrons were produced from the fission or burning of
Uranium 235 atoms contained in the ratio of about 1 to 139 atoms
of Uranium 238 in natural Uranium. The wartime goal of the
Hanford Project was to transmute atoms of Uranium 238 into
Plutonium, which is a different element. In this way, the newly
created fissionable substances could be removed from the remaining
metallic Uranium by chemical processes. Therefore, success in the
Hanford Project was not dependent on creating a Plutonium atom
for every Uranium 235 atom burned up in the process. Further
more, the heat produced in the process was an unwanted by-product
rather than something to be desired. Therefore, the fact that, in
operation, the Hanford reactors produced a net decrease in total
fissionable atoms, and also worked at such low temperatures that
the heat produced was unusable, was accepted gratefully in ex-:
change for usable amounts of Plutonium.
In modern atomic jargon, the Hanford reactor is a negative
breeder. A positive breeder would be one in which advantage is
7
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taken of the fact that more than two neutrons are produced per
fission and an attempt is made to capture these neutrons· so effec
tively in Thorium or Uranium 238 nuclei that the total number of
fissionable atoms actually increases as the. chain reaction proceeeds.
The arithmetic of the breeding process is fairly simple-c--for an _investment of one neutron in a Uranium 235 nucleus you get out
something more than two neutrons. Naturally, one of these neu
trons must be reinvested to maintain the · chain reaction, and one
more must be captured in a Uranium 238 or Thorium nucleus to
replace the Uranium 235 nucleus which has previously fissioned.
The excess, beyond the two neutrons which came out of the fission,
would, in theory, be available for additional capture, and, there
fore, creation of more fissionable atoms. So far, positive breeding
cycles exist only in theory: They are, of course, recognized ·as
tremendously important if they can be achieved in practice.
'

>
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The problem of designing nuclear reactors to operate at high
temperatures is quite independent of breeding. In this case, the
vital questions are chemical and metallurgical, and, certainly, for
mobile power plants, the question of shielding against the intense
gamma radiation and neutrons is of major importance.
It is well to remark that generation of industrial atomic
power on a large scale, in the absen�e of positive breeding, is not
justifiable on the basis of national security. It would be a very
complicated and expensive method of disarming ourselves by burn
ing up most of our stockpile of nuclear fuel. In the case of pro
pulsion of military vehicles, such as aircraft and submarines,
there is a legitimate competition with bombs for the available
stock of nuclear fuel. Furthermore, since the development of pro
totypes can be prosecuted in each case without major expenditure of
nuclear fuel,. there is every reason to proceed with the development
of mobile pow�r plants for aircraft and submarines on an urgent
basis. Then, when the developments bear f:ruit, the national
8
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economy of nuclear fuel, or the strategic situation with respect to
employment of the fuel in power plants or bombs, may have
changed.
The problem of propelling a submarine by nuclear power
is roughly a factor of ten simpler than nuclear propulsion of a

manned aircraft. There are two major factors in this compari
son; the first having to do with thermodynamics, and the second

having to do with shielding weight.

Submarine designers are quite

willing to accept propellers driven by steam turbines, whereas,

such a solution would be unacceptable to aircraft designers in this
age of jet propulsion. · Therefore, the aircraft nuclear power-plant
must operate at the high temperatures required by a turbo-jet

system.

In regard to shielding, it so happens that, while very heavy

·shielding is required in the submarine reactor, this weight can still
be carried by the submarine, whereas, the same shielding weight
would make the airplane unable to fly.
Regardless of the technically dim prospect of achieving nu

clear powered flight, barring some new discovery, the tremendous
gain in milit�ry performance which nuclear power with its practi

cally weightless fuel would give is ample justification for making a.

well controlled and carefully guided major effort to achieve this
goal.
Another major problem in the atomic age relates to the
amount of usable Uranium ore. In the present state of knowledge
of mining and geology, high grade Uranium ore is extremely lim

ited. Prospecting for high grade Uranium ore has gone on on a
non-urgent basis for two generations simply because radium ce1uld

only be found in Uranium deposits. The findings in this search
have been that considerable deposits are located in the Great

9
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Bear Lake region of Canada, in ·Czechoslovakia and in ·the Belgian
Congo. Deposits of low grade ore, in'. which the Uranium is a by

product pf processing for other minerals, are distributed fairly
generally throughout the world. But the impact pf the new de

mand for Uranium as a. material of crucial importance has not yet
produced major changes in the mining and processing industries.
It is probable that during the coming generation the definition of

economical and uneconomical in the mining of Uranium will be
greatly changed. The changes will, of course, be affected by any
new discoveries of freakishly rich deposits.

Thorium is of secondary importance, although more of it is

available than Uranium.

The reason, of course, is that it is not

directly fissionable, and, unless positive breeding becomes a reality,
Thorium would not be of really great significance.

Another problem in prospect in the atomic age relates to

the phifosophy of design and development of atomic weapons and
vehicles for their delivery.

At least, so far as the weapons are

concerned, security restrictions prevent much beyond generaliza

tions.

This is unfortunate because sound rational thinking in the

field of atomic weapons depends to a considerable extent on elilni

nating· mystery and black magic and getting down to what I call

the "nuts and bolts" approach.

Nuclear fission, neutrons and

atomic bomb assembly designs are just as much plain facts of life

of the modern age as are electronics and its application in radar.

The philosophy of the wartime atomic bomb development

assigned tremendous importance to the
design and delivery system.

reliability

of the bomb

At that time, and to a certain extent

now, a mechanical or electrical failure of an atomic bomb which

frustrated its delivery would be such poor overall economy that it
should be avoided even at very large cost.

lQ
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Conventional military vehicles and weapons have been de
veloped by a process of trial and error. The unique feature in
atomic bomb development has been, and still is, the fact that we
are permitted a microscopic number of trials and we allow our
selves no errors. This thinking permeated our wartime philosophy
and resulted in eighteen months of intense development activity in
which full scale dummy bombs were dropped from B-29's under
conditions representative of combat missions. As the development
proceeded, the dummies more and more approached the real McCoy.
For example, the 'final rehearsal of the -Hiroshima flight was a
flight from Tinian to Iwo Jima and return to the vicinity of
Tinian where a non-nuclear duplicate of the Hiroshima bomb was
dropped.
No' amount of attention and effort spent on the bomb itself
could overcome weakness, in the delivery system caused, for ex�
ample, by unreliability of the aircraft or its crew, opposition by
the enemy, or unfavorable weather. Identifying and bombing the
target by radar alone was not considered sufficiently reliable. It
was part of our luck that, by the time enough I fissionable material
had been produced by Oak Ridge and Hanford, our non-nuclear
components were developed and ready, and a practically pe:i;fect
ready-made B-29 delivery organization was available and in full
, operation from the Mariannas to Japan. Under those practically
ideal conditions of guaranteed efficiency of the delivery system,
and absolute control of the air over the target, delivery became a
demonstration.
In my opinion, much fallacious thinking has been generated
by the striking success of the first two atomic' deliveries. The
effect has been to lead many articulate thinkers, including military
planners, unconsciously to discount the effect of difficulties which
-would plague future deliveries in manned subsonic bombers.
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In actual fact, the conventional long-range bomber passed its
peak of effectiveness in 1944 with the. first appearance of the Ger
man jet propelled fighter. The atomic delivery situation over
Japan would have been entirely different if we had faced strong
forces of German jet fighters over the Empire. I am sure that
our approach to the delivery would have been entirely different and
would probably have included heavy escort.
Naturally, the speed of the delivery vehicle when it equals
or exceeds that of our present jet fighters, confers an increasing
amount of protection. Present thinking would concede practical
invulnerability to a delivery vehicle which travels at more than twice
the velocity of sound.
The major limiting factors in the case of guided missiles
are in propulsion and guidance· at ranges of significance to atomic
bomb delivery. As I have indicated earlier, the effective radius of
destruction of an atomic bomb is not so great that we can tolerate .
errors of a mile or more in placing it on the target. This fact re
quires achievement of a high degree of discrimination and re
liability in the navigation brains of an unmanned missile before it
can'. b� entrusted with an atomic warhead. The final choice be
tween manned and unmanned delivery will always depend on the
characteristics of the target, the defense, and the relative location of
the launching base.
Now to change from: purely material and operational consid
erations to an examination of attitudes.. I was impressed through
out the atomic weapon development period of World War II, say
from 1943 to the actual deliveries from the Mariannas, with the ab
solute, hard-boiled, realistic, and pragmatic approach of the scient
ists. They refused to credit even their own best radar systems de
veloped at M. I. T. with being able to identify a target city under
difficult conditions. Even in the Gase of Hiroshima, which was a
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river delta with practically no similarity to any other seaport with
in hundreds of miles, the scientists and military planners demanded
visual delivery. The thoroughness of our preparations was shown
by the fact that up to within two hours of strike time we had weather
planes circling over our several targets.

At the end of World War II, the attitude of our vocal

scientists was abruptly changed from hardboiled realism and

pessimism to a sort of mystic, uncritical acceptance of wild claims
which they had been the first to dismiss during the war. If you

have seen the movie "One World or None", which was put out in an
effort to promote world government, you may remember the state
ment in the ringing voice of Raymond Gram Swing: "The B-29's

which delivered the atomic bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a
range of 1500 miles.

Within six months after the war's end, the

range of atomic bomb carrying airplanes had increased to 6000
miles!" That statement was approved for the script by some of
the same scientists who would have refused to credit the B-29 with
a range of 1800 miles during World War II.
This change of attitude perhaps resulted from shock. I
would illustrate further effects of this shock by quoting from an
article by W. A. Higginbotham, in the New York Times, Magazine
Section, November 3, 1946: "______no scientist sees any possibility of

defense, for two main reasons:
"1.

Because atomic energy is the basic energy of the universe and

"2.

Because man will always make mistakes in the operation of any

its crushing force is all-powerful.

defense system."

"Neither of these factors will change.

There can be no defense

against the atomic bomb". This quotation is a typical example of

13
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the sincerely motivated campaign of the atomic scientists, conduct
ed throughout 1946 and the early part of 1947.
Now I will read a comment on the effect of such a campaign,

written by an expert in psychological warfare, who was in charge of

the Psychological Branch of the Dutch War Ministry and a member

of the Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group in England during
the late war. This was in a letter to the New York Times, in June
1947.

I will read extracts from it:

"The general idea in this atomic war of nerves appears to be

that fear of another war and fear of the bomb's tremendous des

truction will force mankind nearer to a constructive plan for peace.

This idea, however, must be contested since, down through the

ages, fear has been a notoriously bad leader of mankind.

Too

great a fear ends in one of two reactions, neither of which is con

structive.

''In the first place, such a fear can paralyze the human mind

-hypnotize it, as it were, make it passive, ready to accept dangers

of war rather than bear the nervous tension of peace .
Psychology we call it passive surrender to the thing feared.

In

"On the other hand, such a fear, which still works on the

human mind as primitive fear did in the ancient world, can pro

voke mankind to frantic explosions of aggression . When fear af

fects men in this manner they try to deal the first blow-to cast the

first bomb.

"
"The confused state of mind, resulting from this combination

of post-war guilt feelings and the fears engendered by the atomic

war of nerves, resembles ancient periods when people waited pass
ively for the world's doom because of an undefined magic spell and
14
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mysterious fear passed on from general anxiety with which the
world of those days we.re infected. In the middle ages this kind
of mood spread along with the pandemics of the epoch ( the Black

Death, Plague, etc.).

"
"During the hectic days when the Germans were success
fully executing their war of nerves I thought that I had seen some

deadly psychological warfare, but none of those attacks, I now feel,

could out-do the atomic war of nerves to which we are being sub
jected."

In my opinion, this mystic attitude toward the atomic bomb

has become dangerously widespread in the United States and has af
fected the thinking of many intelligent people, including military

'planners. The general idea seems to be that the potency of the
atomic bomb somehow lends a considerable degree of invulner
ability to its carrying vehicle, that the "absolute" weapon will be
delivered. "inevitably" to the intended target, and that the results
will be cataclysmic to the target.

It

is of crucial importance to our national defense that all

of these shaky, unprovable assumptions be subjected to the most
searching and skeptical analysis and test. It should also be re
membered that whatever we know, or do not know, about the abil
ity of our possible enemies to produce and deliver atomic bombs,
they most certainly are aware of our capabilities in this respect.
Therefore, if we are provoked into a war, even a Hitler will have

anticipated and made reasonable allowances for our known ability to
strike his key ·cities with atomic bombs.
I worry when I see in the Saturday Evening Post of Septem
ber 11, 1948, an article by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, from which
I will read an extract:

15
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"What is novel in the new concept is the additional pro

vision of a small, specialized offensive force, such as was not avail
able to the democracies in 1914 or 1939. Only a minor percentage

of total resources will be invested in this special force, which will be
composed primarily of long-range bombers. But the bombers will
carry the absolute weapons, and will have the mission of destroy
ing the enemy's vitals in immediate retaliation for the first ag

gressive act.

By this destruction of the enemy's vitals, it is hoped

that the general counter-offensive will become possible not after

four years but after as many months. It is hoped, in short, that even
if the deterrent fails, even if war comes despite all our labors to

avoid it, the war may yet be short and the world we know may

yet be saved.

"In illustration of what one must pray will never occur, let

us suppose that the worst has happened.

War has begun after the

new strategic concept has been implemented.

Of the uncounted

divisions of . the .Soviet empire, as many as can be rapidly trans

ported-probably over 100-will be instantly launched across
Europe toward the English Channel.

The nations of the Western

European Union will dispose their forty-five divisions on their se

lected defensive line--most probably the Rhine, which is so distant

from Russia that logistical factors will limit the first impact of the
Red Army's attack.

Fleets of transports will be gathered to

strengthen the divisions of Europe with divisions from the United
States.

"As the battle is joined on land, the struggle for control of

the seas will break out with fury, for the Red Fleet now possesses

a formidable submarine force. Sabotage also will begin, of such
character and on such a scale as will seriously impede the first ef
fort of the West.
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"Meanwhile, however, on the first notice of attack, orders
will go out to the special offensive force. · From the United States,
long trains of aircraft will fly, by day and night, to their pre
pared bases across the Atlantic. There, at points beyond the im�
mediate reach of the strong Russian Ground Arm, will be all the
facilities, all the supplies for immediate air warfare, from run

ways to hospitals, from gasoline to ammunition. While the vast
Soviet Army is still grinding across Europe, the air missions will
strike out-1800 miles, 2000 miles, 2200 miles-toward the targets
of E,ussia. From Baku north to Leningrad, from Smolensk west

to Novosibirsk, the vitals of the Soviet State will be scorched and
destroyed with the terrible fire of the atomic bomb.

"Soon, at the distant front, the disaster at the center will

be felt. The Giant's arm will still be brawny, but he will be sorely
stricken at the heart. As the arm falters from the heart's injury,

so must the Red Army falter if cut off from all support except
from the sullen satellites. And then the forces of the West, which
once seemed almost too weak for defense, will of a sudden become
strong enough for the attack. The change in relative strengths
will permit a general counter-offensive by the Western Armies in

which all will join. And the great war machine will be hurled
back across Europe, along the road by which it came."
Meditating on this extract, I think back to an article in

Esquire Magazine for January 1942, which was already on the

newstands on December 7, 1941. In it an American expert on Jap
an included these as the clinching and last paragraphs of his
article:

"Japanese fighting men have proved their courage in suc

cessives victories; their courage under a preliminary defeat is yet

to be shown. They have demonstrated their fighting prowess
against poorer trained and slower thinking people; they have yet to
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meet a nation that can out-think them, as can every other nation
today ranking as a first-class power. Those who know the Jap
anese do not believe they could stand up in any vital test of the kind,

except in defense of their homeland, when they could fight on their

own terms on a terrain they know thoroughly and for the land they
love.

"As ·a menace to any country of any fighting consequence,

Japan does not exist.

"As a first-class power, Japan is a myt�.
"The sooner this· fact is recognized, the sooner will all talk

of war with Japan die away, to the betterment of the world and to
the betterment of Japan."

The warnings I have given are certainly not intended to

belittle the atomi� bomb in any respect. They are primarily directed.
toward a return of our thinking to the hardboiled, realistic kind
which pr�duced the bomb in the first place. We have need of such
thinking in these parlous times.
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